In the Dragon's Shadow — Full notes

These are my raw notes from In the Dragon’s Shadow. For the review, see this post.

Chapter 1: Pivot of the Indo-Pacific

• China has a southward movement similar to the USA’s manifest destiny moment (14)
• Overall SE Asia is a relatively new concept, and even giving it a name changes what it is (17)
• China has mostly focused on Economic influence over political influence (21)
• The notion of “debt-trap” diplomacy (24, 32)
• Over time China’s posturing to its neighbors has changed; so has other nations views towards it

Chapter 2: Marching towards the tropics

• China was constrained by geographical position historically with mountains and oceans bordering it
• John Garver termed the modern ability to bend this terrain to the will of the nation as “technological subjugation” (42)
• Chinese scholars considered the push southward “inevitable” (49)
• Because China is geographically higher in the west than their southeast neighbors, their damming efforts affect the Mekong and this gives implicit control of neighbors (58)
• One way of influence is infrastructure financing, which has led to an “‘infrastructure arms race’ between Beijing and Tokyo” (62)

Chapter 3: Vietnam

• One Vietnamese described China as “a two-faced friend”, meaning that China is both an important ally and competitor (66)
• Vietnam and China have a lot of historical connections, with many Vietnamese artifacts of Chinese culture touching on things such as mandarin system and Confucianism (67)
• In contrast to the Chinese government, the Vietnamese government has less control over the narrative—leading to differences sometimes in what subsets of the population believes and the party line (77)
• Vietnam is hugely dependent on Chinese trade and tourism, giving China a bargaining chip (79-80)
• US and other countries see Vietnam as the holding line for the South China Sea, which is why there has been a huge focus on diplomatic relations with the country (81)

Chapter 4: Cambodia and Laos

Cambodia

• China aligned itself with the Khmer Rouge for strategic reasons, desiring to counter Soviet Union and Vietnam (86)
• China supported leaders in Cambodia that aligned to their interest, including one, Hun Sen, who closed a Taiwanese office. China provided money and goods as the west backed away (90).
• Cambodia acted as a blocker in ASEAN response to China’s claims in the South China Sea (91).
• There’s a good amount of anti-Vietnamese sentiment due to historical land-grabs and a belief Vietnam still wants to take over the nation. Cambodian leaders see the “enemy of my enemy” (China) as their friend because of this (94)
• Chinese support is much faster than Western or Japanese support (95)
• Cambodia had to choose between Western and Chinese support, and threat of sanctions along with perception of ability to choose their own destiny made them choose China (102)

Laos

• Laos is effectively a creation of the French and colonialism, nothing similar to it existed prior to their creation of these borders (106)
• China provides financing without many strings, unlike Western powers (109)
• Vietnam maintains close ties and influence on Laos. There’s a quote about Laos taking money from China but being more influenced by Vietnam (114)
• “Adaptation is our politics” (116)

Chapter 5: Thailand

• Chinese tourism to Thailand has increased quite dramatically in the 2010s (perhaps due to a film) but so have complaints about Chinese tourists. China has released a guidebook called Guidebook for Civilized Tourism to help guide foreign travel for its citizens (118-119)
• It’s fun for the Thai to complain about tourists, but need them for the economy (120)
• When Thailand had a military coup, China and the US had very different responses. The US cut financial support while China considered it an internal concern within Thailand (123)
• Thailand has been a close US ally since WWII (124)
• China gave financial support to Thailand when their economy collapsed, while the US did not (126)
• Support of the USA is a generational thing in Thailand with older Thais having a bit more reverence for the US and younger generations “more ambivalent” (128)
• Almost all Thai leadership is ethnically Chinese (130)
• “Bamboo in the wind” is a Siamese saying of being rooted while also being flexible enough to move with prevailing wind (132)
• Thailand is a large enough economy to have room to negotiate with China (132)
• Mekong expansion might continue to expand Thailand’s deficit with China (136)
• Kra Canal is an idea that’s been around for a while and never acted on. If it were acted on, it would adjust the importance of other ports/straights within the region dramatically (137)
• “in Thailand, the bureaucracy dominates” (140)

Chapter 6: Burma

• Myitsone dam was a project schemed by the military in Burma without public knowledge. This caused a huge public outcry and caused it’s pause (143)
• During the Obama administration, the US started normalizing relations with Burma. Historically Burma had little strategic value to the US, so the US had no reason not to define the relationship in the values the US says it believes in (146)
• Burma tried political neutrality for many years post-colonialism to prevent being sucked into China’s orbit during Cold War (152)
• Violence against the Rohingya started in 2017 and there’s a connection to the arbitrary and without-thought colonialism of the British (158)
• Burma is a “map maker’s fiction” (159)
• Anti-Rohingya violence was spurred on by internet and Facebook suddenly being widely available in the country (160)
• The US and Europe reimposed sanctions during this time but China considered it Burma fighting terrorism and “internal” to the country (163)
• China has a desire to stabilize the region for mostly economic reasons [connecting southwest / trade] (168)
• 2021 brought a military coup [not discussed much in this book] (171)

Chapter 7: Singapore

• Malacca straight has had importance for many centuries due to geography. At one point there was the city Malacca that was an important port but it fell off. Later Singapore has taken a similar position (178)
• The Ming withdrew from sea exploration but modern China is returning to wanting to explore/control the sea (182, 183)
• South China Sea is important for China’s shipping lines (184)
• There was a documentary “River Elegy” that encouraged China to return to the sea—though there was some message about openness here too (185)
• Zheng, the Ming figure, is sometimes considered a metaphor for how China’s return to sea will be different, though history doesn’t always agree with the pedestal he is placed on (187)
• Singapore is second largest container port after Shanghai (191)
• Singapore was seen by neighboring countries as in partnership with China—Singapore held off from diplomatic relations with PRC until 1990 to reassure these neighbors (after they had developed these relationships) (192)
• Singapore is an important partner to both China and US (unique position) (194)
• The Kra canal is a potentially existential threat to Singapore (Chinese financing could give China leverage) (197)
• Pro-Chinese media has made older generations more pro-China, though younger generations are less connected (202)

[My focus on this book and note-taking quality declined dramatically at this point.]

Chapter 8: Malaysia

• Forest city is a Chinese project that brought in both Chinese investment and immigration. To locals, this felt uneasily similar to historical colonialism and the historical Singapore split (208)
• Malaysia has been of interest to many colonial powers, including Portuguese, Dutch, and the British due to the geographical importance of the Malacca straight (208-209)
• China leveraged 1MDB scandal—leaning in while other countries leaned away. Once again focusing on the messaging of “non interference” with internal issues (212)
• Malaysia is less vocal about South China Sea intrusions than its neighbors (219)
• Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia are decreasing in proportion and are a scapegoat for many (225)

Chapter 9: Indonesia

• Chinese traders have been in the Indonesian region since Song times and have intermingled throughout (231)
• Indonesia once had the third largest communist party in the world and deviated in the “September 30th Movement” with US cheers and (maybe) support (233)
• Asian financial crisis brought back memories of colonialism when IMF came in to assist. China offered emergency medical aid in a perceived-to-be-less humiliating way (236)
• Illegal fishing has been a major point of contention, leading to conflict with China and other neighbors (239)
• Majority has become increasingly more vocal and Chinese minority has been the focus of racial conflict (244, 247)
• Indonesia is “inward looking” in recent times (252)

Chapter 10: The Philippines

• The Philippines had historically had conflict with China over their Exclusive Economic Zone but recently shifted away from the US and towards China with Duterte (258, 259)
• In 2018, 83% of Filipinos had a positive view of the US (260)
• Freedomland was a small island nation created by an individual but never recognized. The Philippines reasserted its control of this land and this is a key location for expression of their EEZ and conflict with China (266)
• Military leaders in the country saw the US as insurance against the rise of China and pushed back against pushing the US military out (270)
• Duterte believes in close ties and alliances with China and this is the one topic that he is unpopular on locally (272)

Afterwards

• Southeast Asia is highly fragmented but some consider this a good thing as a robust defense against being controlled by any one power (289)